Serbia was involved in the Yugoslav Wars in the period between 1991 and 1999--the war in Slovenia, the war in Croatia, the war in Bosnia and the war in Kosovo. During this period from 1991 to 1997, Slobodan Milo?evi? was the President of Serbia, Serbia was part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has established that Milo?evi? was in control of Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia during the wars which were fought there from 1991 to 1995.
Accused of supporting Serb rebels in Croatia and Bosnia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was suspended from most international organisations and institutions, and economic and political sanctions were imposed, which resulted in economic disaster and massive emigration from the country. Various judicial proceedings at the ICTY have investigated the different levels of responsibility of the Yugoslav People's Army and the leadership of the FRY and Serbia for the war crimes that were committed by ethnic Serbs who lived in other republics of the former Yugoslavia, while the Government of Serbia was tasked with apprehending numerous ethnic Serb fugitives for the Tribunal, with which it largely complied.
Milo?evi? used a rigid control of the media to organize a propaganda campaign in which the thesis that Serbs were the victims and the need for readjust Yugoslavia to redress the alleged bias against Serbia. This then was then followed by Milo?evi?'s anti-bureaucratic revolution in which the governments of Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro were overthrown, which gave Milo?evi? the dominating position of 4 votes out of 8 in Yugoslavia's collective presidency.
The Constitution of Yugoslavia (1974 Constitution), in its Basic Principles, in the very beginning, stated "The peoples of Yugoslavia, starting from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession,...". The opinion of the Serb leadership of that time was that the internal borders of Yugoslavia were provisional. The basis for this statement was derived from the Constitution of Yugoslavia. President Slobodan Milo?evi?, also the leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia, had repeatedly stated that all Serbs should enjoy the right to be included in Serbia. Mihajlo Markovi?, the Vice President of the Main Committee of Serbia's Socialist Party, rejected any solution that would make Serbs outside Serbia a minority. He proposed establishing a federation consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, BiH, Macedonia and Serbs residing in the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, Slavonia, Baranja, and Srem.
Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991. Both were internationally recognized on 15 January 1992. Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence on 5 March 1992. It was internationally recognized on 22 May 1992 by the United Nations. With the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a sole successor state of SFR Yugoslavia, on 27 April 1992. It remained unrecognized during the conflict.
The Serbian media during Milo?evi?'s era was known to espouse Serb nationalism while promoting xenophobia toward the other ethnicities in Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanians were commonly characterised in the media as anti-Yugoslav counter-revolutionaries, rapists, and a threat to the Serb nation. When war erupted in Croatia, Politika promoted Serb nationalism, hostility towards Croatia, and violence.
On 5 June 1991, Politika ekspres ran a piece titled "Serbs must get weapons". On 25 June 1991 and 3 July 1991, Politika began to openly promote partitioning Croatia, and prominently quoted Jovan Marjanovi? of the Serbian Renewal Movement, who said "The [Yugoslav] Army must come into Croatia and occupy the line Benkovac-Karlovac-Pakrac-Baranja". On 25 June 1991, Politika reminded Serbs about the atrocities perpetrated by the Croatian fascist Ustase against Serbs during World War II; "Jasenovac [an Ustase concentration camp in World War II] mustn't be forgotten".
Serbian state media during the wars featured controversial reportage that villainized the other ethnic factions. In one such program, a Croatian Serb woman denounced the old "communist policy" in Croatia, claiming that under it "[t]he majority of Serbs would be assimilated in ten years", while another interviewee stated "Where Serbian blood was shed by Ustasha knives, there will be our boundaries." Various Serbian state television reports featured Jovan Ra?kovi?,[who?] who stated the Croatian people had a "genocidal nature".
The director of Radio Television of Serbia during Milo?evi?'s era, Du?an Mitevi?, later admitted, in a PBS documentary, that "the things that happened at state TV, warmongering, things we can admit to now: false information, biased reporting. That went directly from Milo?evi? to the head of TV".
During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the concept of a Greater Serbia was widely seen outside of Serbia as the motivating force for the military campaigns undertaken to form and sustain Serbian states on the territories of the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Croatia (the Republic of Serbian Krajina) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Republika Srpska).
Immediately after the Slovenian independence referendum, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) announced a new defence doctrine that would apply across the country. The socialist doctrine of "General People's Defence", in which each republic maintained a Territorial Defence Force (TO), was to be replaced by a centrally-directed system of defence. The republics would lose their role in defence matters, and their TOs would be disarmed and subordinated to JNA headquarters in Belgrade. The Slovenian government resisted these moves, and successfully ensured that the majority of Slovenian Territorial Defence equipment was kept out of the hands of the JNA.
General Veljko Kadijevi? was de facto commander of Yugoslav People's Army during the Slovenian Independence War. The officer corps was dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins. The rank and file troops however were conscripts, many who had no strong motivation in fighting against the Slovenes. Of the soldiers of the 5th Military District, which was in action in Slovenia, about 30% were Albanians. Milo?evi?'s government was not particularly concerned about Slovenia's independence, as there was no significant Serb minority in the country. On 30 June, Defence Minister General Kadijevi? suggested to the Yugoslav federal presidency a massive attack on Slovenia to break down the unexpectedly heavy resistance. But the Serb representative, Borisav Jovi?, shocked the military establishment by declaring that Serbia did not support further military action against Slovenia.
Milo?evi? believes he now has the historic opportunity to, once and for all, settle accounts with the Croats and do what Serbian politicians after World War I did not - rally all Serbs in one Serbian state.-- Belgrade newspaper Borba, August 1991.
In May 1991, Stipe Mesi?, a Croat, was scheduled to be the chairman of the rotating Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but Serbia blocked his installation, so this maneuver technically left Yugoslavia without a leader.
In various verdicts, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded that Krajina presidents Milan Babi? and Milan Marti? were cooperating with Serbia's president Milo?evi? who sent ammunition, financial assistance and the JNA and Serb paramilitary as back up during 1991 and 1992 in order to take over large chunks of Croatia. After the United Nations imposed sanctions against Serbia, the JNA formally withdrew from Croatia by May 1992. However, in the 2011 verdict regarding Mom?ilo Peri?i?, the ICTY established that Belgrade was, through the 30th and 40th Personnel Centre, still supplying armies of Krajina and Republika Srpska all until 1995, despite international sanctions. In the judgement, the judges ruled that members of the Yugoslav Army served under banners of Military of Serbian Krajina (SVK) and VRS, but received pensions, salaries, benefits and promotions directly from Belgrade. Although Peri?i? did not have effective control over the VRS, he had control of the SVK, but failed to sanction them for the Zagreb rocket attacks.
During the Bosnian war, it was a part of the strategic plan of the Serb leadership, which aimed to link Serb-populated areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to gain control over these areas and create a separate Serb state, from which most non-Serbs would be permanently removed. The Serb leadership was aware that its strategic plan could only be implemented by the use of force and fear, such as the commission of war crimes.
The Bosnian Serb Army was "under the overall control" of Belgrade and the Yugoslav Army, which meant that they had funded, equipped and assisted the coordination and planning of military operations. The Army of Republika Srpska arose from the Yugoslav army forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite sanctions, Belgrade was still the main source of soldiers, ammunition, spare parts and financial assistance for Republika Srpska until 1995.
Milo?evi? realized that Bosnia and Herzegovina was about to be recognized by the international community, and since Yugoslav Army troops were still located there at that time, their presence on Bosnian territory could have led to Serbia and Montenegro being accused of aggression. To avoid this, Milo?evi? decided to move all JNA soldiers who originated from Serbia and Montenegro back into Serbia and Montenegro, and move all JNA soldiers who originated from Bosnia and Herzegovina back into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, every Bosnian Serb was transferred from the Yugoslav army to what became the newly created Bosnian Serb Army. Through this, the Bosnian Serb army received extensive military equipment and full funding from the FRY, because the Bosnian Serb faction could not cover the costs on its own.
The Bosnian Serb Army was led by Ratko Mladi?, an extremely controversial figure, who served in the Yugoslav Army during the Croatian War of Independence 1991-1992, and has been accused of committing war crimes in Bosnia.
On 24 March 2016, the ICTY issued its judgement in the separate case against former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karad?i?, in which it concluded that insufficient evidence had been presented in that case to find that Slobodan Milosevic "agreed with the common plan" to create territories ethnically cleansed of non-Serbs during the Bosnian War of 1992 to 1995. The judgement noted "Milo?evi?'s repeated criticism and disapproval of the policies and decisions made by Karad?i? and the Bosnian Serb leadership" and, in a footnote, the "apparent discord between Karad?i? and Milo?evi?" during which Milo?evi? "openly criticised Bosnian Serb leaders of committing 'crimes against humanity' and 'ethnic cleansing' and the war for their own purposes." Nevertheless, the court also noted that "Milo?evi? provided assistance in the form of personnel, provisions, and arms to the Bosnian Serbs during the conflict"
The Serbian Radical Party founder and paramilitary leader Vojislav Seselj publicly claimed that Milo?evi? personally asked him to send paramilitaries from Serbia into Bosnia and Herzegovina. After 1993, media reports of large-scale atrocities by the Bosnian Serb armed forces, such as the long siege of Sarajevo, resulted in increased pressure and sanctions by western governments against Serbia and Montenegro to persuade Milo?evi? to withdraw his support of the Bosnian Serbs. After 1993, Milo?evi? abandoned his alliance with the Serbian Radical Party and declared that his government advocated a peaceful settlement to the war. The new coalition government abandoned its support of Radovan Karad?i?'s Bosnian Serb government and pressured the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a peace treaty. During the Dayton Accord, Milo?evi? sparred with Karad?i?, who opposed the Dayton Accord, which Milo?evi? supported as it gave Bosnian Serbs autonomy and self-governance over most of the territories they had claimed. In 1995, Milo?evi?, President of Serbia, represented the Bosnian Serbs during the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
In 1998, facing political crisis, Milo?evi? again formed a national-unity government with the Serbian Radical Party. After 1998, conflict in Kosovo intensified. The Yugoslav Army and the Serbian Police were in spring 1999. "in an organized manner, with significant use of state resources" conducted a broad campaign of violence against Albanian civilians in order to expel them from Kosovo and thus maintain political control of Belgrade over the province.
By June 1999, the Yugoslav military, Serbian police and paramilitaries expelled 862,979 Albanians from Kosovo, and several hundred thousand more were internally displaced, in addition to those displaced prior to March. Presiding Judge Iain Bonomy concluded that "deliberate actions of these forces during the campaign provoked the departure of at least 700,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo in the short period from late March to early June 1999".
Religious objects were also damaged or destroyed. Of the 498 mosques in Kosovo that were in active use, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) documented that 225 mosques sustained damage or destruction by the Yugoslav Serb army. In all, eighteen months of the Yugoslav Serb counterinsurgency campaign between 1998-1999 within Kosovo resulted in 225 or a third out of a total of 600 mosques being damaged, vandalised, or destroyed. During the war, Islamic architectural heritage posed for Yugoslav Serb paramilitary and military forces as Albanian patrimony with destruction of non-Serbian architectural heritage being a methodical and planned component of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
Numerous war crimes were committed by Serbian military and Serbian paramilitary forces during the Yugoslav Wars. The crimes included massacres, ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, crimes against humanity and genocide. The International Court of Justice, cleared the Republic of Serbia of direct involvement in genocide, but found that it had failed to prevent mass killings, rapes, and ethnic cleansing.
The war crimes were usually carried out on ethnic and religious grounds and were primarily directed against civilians (Albanians, Croats, Bosniaks). Several United Nations bodies have judged that the aim of these war crimes in various wars was to create an ethnically pure Serbian state, or "Greater Serbia", encompassing Serbia as well as the Serb-populated areas in former Yugoslavia.
After the wars in the 1990s, many senior military and political leaders were convicted of war crimes; Radovan Karad?i? he was tried and found guilty of war crimes in March, 2016, and sentenced to 40 years in prison. Others, including Ratko Mladi? and Goran Had?i?, were not apprehended by Serbian authorities until 2011.
All parties involved in the conflict have committed "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. These violations include the killing of civilians, rape, torture, and the deliberate destruction of civilian property, including cultural and religious property, such as churches and mosques. But, there are significant qualitative differences. Most of the violations were committed by Serbs against Bosnian Muslims.-- Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
Had?i? died while awaiting trial in July 2016. Mladi? received life imprisonment. According to definition of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Serbian forces included the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), Serb Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the Military of Serbian Krajina, the Army of Republika Srpska, territorial defense of Serbia and Montenegro, Police of Serbia and Police of Republika Srpska, including national security, special police forces of Krajina known as Marti?evci (after Milan Marti?), as well as all Serbian paramilitary forces and volunteer units.
The Tribunal claimed that around 170,000 Croats were expelled from territories Serbian forces sought to control. Rebel Croatian Serbs' forces together with Serbian military and paramilitary forces committed numerous war crimes and massacres in Republic of Croatia:
There were also prison camps, where several hundred Croatian prisoners of war and civilians were kept by Serbian authorities.
According to the Croatian Association of Prisoners in Serbian Concentration Camps, a total of 8,000 Croatian civilians and POWs (many following the fall of Vukovar) went through Serb prison camps such as Sremska Mitrovica camp, Staji?evo camp, Ni? camp and many others where many were heavily abused and tortured. A total of 300 people never returned from them. A total of 4570 camp inmates have started legal action against the former Republic of Serbia and Montenegro (now Serbia) for torture and abuse in the camps.
According to Croatia's lawsuit against Yugoslavia (later the Republic of Serbia) in front of the International Court of Justice, 590 cities and villages were damaged and 35 entirely razed to the ground, three national parks, five natural parks and 19 park cultural monuments were damaged while 171,000 housing units (about 10 percent of the entire housing capacity of the country) were destroyed or damaged in Croatia during the war. About three million landmines were left by the warring fractions that blocked about 300,000 hectares of arable land.
In its verdict against Ante Gotovina, the ICTY for the first time also concluded that the war in Croatia constituted an international armed conflict as the military of Serbian Krajina acted as an extension to Serbia's military.
In particular, the Trial Chamber considered the evidence pertaining to Serbian President Milo?evi?'s control and influence over SVK forces and Serbia/FRY's funding, arming and supplying of the Krajina Serbs. Based on the above evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that Serbia/FRY had overall control of the SVK. Recalling the agreement of all the parties that Croatia and Serbia were engaged more broadly in hostilities around the beginning of the Indictment period, the Trial Chamber further finds that the armed conflict that existed at the outset of the Indictment period was international. If it was not already an international armed conflict in 1991, then it became one based on the SVK acting on behalf of Serbia/FRY-- ICTY in its verdict against Ante Gotovina
There were several concentration and prison camps in Bosnia, run by Serbs:
The Court concludes that the acts committed at Srebrenica falling within Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention were committed with the specific intent to destroy in part the group of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such; and accordingly that these were acts of genocide, committed by members of the VRS in and around Srebrenica from about 13 July 1995.
In the spring of 1999, the Serbian police and the Yugoslav Army were "in an organized manner, with significant use of state resources" conducted a broad campaign of violence against Albanian civilians in order to expel them from Kosovo and thus maintain political control of Belgrade over the province.
According to the legally binding verdict of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Federal Army and Serbian police after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia 24 March 1999, systematically attacked villages with Albanian population, abused, robbed and killed civilians, ordering them to go to Albania or Montenegro, burning their houses and destroying by their property. Within the campaign of violence, Albanians were mass expelled from their homes, murdered, sexually assaulted, and their religious buildings destroyed. Serbian forces committed numerous war crimes during the implementation of "joint criminal enterprise" whose aim was to "through the use of violence and terror, force a significant number of Kosovo Albanians to leave their homes, across the border, the state government to retain control over Kosovo".Ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population is performed by the following model: first the army surrounded a place, then followed the shelling, then the police entered the village, and often with them and the army, and then crimes occurs (murders, rapes, beatings, expulsions ... ).
Presiding Judge Iain Bonomy was imposing sentence said, "deliberate actions of these forces during the campaign provoked the departure of at least 700,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo in the short period from late March to early June 1999."
The following is an incomplete list of massacres attributed to Serb forces:
Goran Stopari?, an ex-member of the Special Anti-terrorist Unit (SAJ), speculating about motives behind the Podujevo massacre, stated:
In my opinion, the only motive was the fact that the victims were Albanians, and perhaps because of some hidden immaturity or sickness of mind on their part. They would probably have killed them had they been Bosnians or Croats. But it is certain that they were killed because they were not Serbs.
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International Court of Justice treated all violent conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia until 7 September 1991 as internal clashes or civil war. But after that date, all conflicts, especially armed confrontations and human victims, are international armed conflicts.Republic of Serbia officially denied any military engagement into Bosnian War and Croatian War for Independence. However, many Serbian political, military and paramilitary leaders (including Slobodan Milo?evi?, Vojislav ?e?elj, Jovica Stani?i?, Franko Simatovi?, Veljko Kadijevi?, Blagoje Ad?i? and ?eljko Ra?natovi?) were accused of war crimes committed in Bosnia and Croatia. According to Prosecution, those leaders participated in a joint criminal enterprise aimed to established "Greater Serbia" from the disintegrating Yugoslavia.
The prosecution's argument that [...] the allegations made in the three indictments [Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo] were all part of a common scheme, strategy or plan on the part of the accused [Slobodan Milo?evi?] to create a "Greater Serbia", a centralised Serbian state encompassing the Serb-populated areas of Croatia and Bosnia and all of Kosovo, and that this plan was to be achieved by forcibly removing non-Serbs from large geographical areas through the commission of the crime charged in the indictments. Although the events in Kosovo were separated from those in Croatia and Bosnia by more than three years, they were, the prosecution claimed, no more than a continuation of that plan, and they could only be understood completely by reference to what had happened in Croatia and Bosnia.-- Decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber; 18 April 2002.
Complicity in a joint criminal enterprise also included "Serbian forces", that includes the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), later the Yugoslav Army (VJ), the newly formed Serbian Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, Republic of Serbian Krajina Army, the Army of the Republika Srpska, territorial defense of Serbia and Montenegro, the police of Serbia and the police of Republika Srpska, including national security, special police forces of the Krajina region known as "Marti?evci, as well as all Serbian paramilitary forces and volunteer units.
Slobodan Milo?evi?, along with Milan Milutinovi?, Nikola ?ainovi?, Dragoljub Ojdani? and Vlajko Stojiljkovi? were charged by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with crimes against humanity including murder, forcible transfer, deportation and "persecution on political, racial or religious grounds" during the Kosovo War. Further indictments were leveled in October 2003 against former armed forces chief of staff Neboj?a Pavkovi?, former army corps commander Vladimir Lazarevi?, former police official Vlastimir ?or?evi? and the current head of Serbia's public security, Sreten Luki?. All were indicted for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. Tribunal prosecutor's office has accused Milosevic of "the gravest violations of human rights in Europe since the Second World War". Milo?evi? died in detention before he could be sentenced.
The democratic leadership of Serbia recognized the need to investigate Serbian war crimes after the fall of Milo?evi?, and a special war crimes tribunal was founded in Belgrade in 2003, after the Parliament of Serbia passed the Law on Organization and Competence of State Bodies in the Proceedings Against War Crimes Perpetrators.
Since then, the special prosecutor has prosecuted and the court has convicted several individuals for instances of war crimes, also committed under the command of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs and other state agencies.
In Serbia, many people deny war crimes imputed to Serbia or the Serb people. The policy of war crime denials is implemented through the Serbian educational system that teaches schoolchildren about crimes committed against Serbs, but not about crimes committed by Serbs.[when?] Some public figures who are known for speaking openly about crimes committed by Serbs are labeled as a "traitors".
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Despite the ICTY finding, confirmed by the ICJ, a range of alternative views of the Srebrenica massacre exist, most of which argue that fewer than 8,000 were killed. The denial of the figure points out that fewer names were listed, that some were not even killed in that area and had died in previous years, in some cases people turned out to be alive, etc.
Denial of the Srebrenica genocide takes many forms. The methods range from the brutal to the deceitful. Denial is present most strongly in political discourse, in the media, in the sphere of law, and in the educational system.
According to Human Rights Watch, the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party "launched an aggressive campaign to prove that Muslims had committed crimes against thousands of Serbs in the area", which "was intended to diminish the significance of the July 1995 crime". The ICTY Office of the Prosecutor noted that the number of Serb deaths in the region alleged by the Serbian authorities had increased from 1400 to 3500, a figure the Prosecutor stated "[does] not reflect the reality". Personal details were only available for 624 victims. The validity of labeling some of the casualties as "victims" is also contested -- studies have found a significant majority of military casualties as compared to civilian casualties.
The Serbian police denied perpetrating the Drenica massacres in February-March 1998 and claimed they were just pursuing "terrorists" who had attacked the police. A police spokesman denied the "lies and inventions" about indiscriminate attacks and excessive force and said "the police has never resorted to such methods and never will." Belgrade government also denied responsibility for Vu?itrn and Gornje Obrinje massacre on 26 September 1998. President Slobodan Milosevic has denied a policy of ethnic cleansing during the NATO bombing in Kosovo 1999, but the Court latter found that Serbian state conducted systematic campaign of terror and violence against Kosovo Albanians in order to expel them from Kosovo.
The high number of casualties incurred in the Battle of Vukovar caused serious popular discontent in Serbia and Montenegro, where tens of thousands of those receiving draft papers went into hiding or left the country. A near-mutiny broke out in some reservist units, and mass demonstrations against the war were held in the Serbian towns of Valjevo, ?a?ak and Kragujevac. In one famous incident, a tank driver named Vladimir ?ivkovi? drove his tank all the way from the front line at Vukovar to the federal parliament in Belgrade. Many Serbs did not identify with the Croatian Serb cause and were unwilling to see their lives, or those of their children, sacrificed at Vukovar.
Following the end of Yugoslav Wars, Serbian war crimes court sparked controversy on at least four occasions after issuing indictments and arrest warrants against non-Serbs that were later found to be entirely unfounded. These indictments against foreign citizens of Serbia are perceived by some as key to redressing the "aggressor-victim" balance in the wars.
A study conducted in the Greater Toronto Area, involving the University of Toronto, regarding Posttraumatic stress disorder, found symptoms of PTSD in 26.3% of Serbian children due to war-related stress or during the Kosovo conflict.
At the conclusion of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, numerous Serbs relocated to Serbia and Montenegro. By 1996, Serbia and Montenegro hosted about 300,000 registered refugees from Croatia and 250,000 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, while an additional 15,000 persons from Macedonia and Slovenia were also registered as refugees. The UNHCR registered 566,000 refugees from Croatia and Bosnia in Serbia and Montenegro. During the first half of 1996, more than 40,000 Bosnian Serbs arrived in the FRY. About three quarters had left suburbs of Sarajevo that were to fall under the control of the Bosnian Federation. Following the Kosovo war, 200,000 to 245,000 Serb, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian people fled into Serbia proper or within Kosovo, fearing revenge, and due to severe violence and terrorist attacks against mostly Serbian civilians after the war amounting to about 700,000 displaced or refugees in that country. One out of every eleven people was either a refugees or displacee in Serbia by 1999. This made that country host to one of the largest populations of displaced people in Europe.
The Yugoslav National Army (JNA), under Mr Milo?evi?'s control, prevented Croatian authorities from restoring law and order.
Gravely concerned about the deterioration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina owing to intensified aggressive acts by the Serbian and Montenegrin forces to acquire more territories by force, characterized by a consistent pattern of unacceptable and systematic violations of human rights, a burgeoning refugee population resulting from mass expulsions of defenceless civilians from their homes and the existence in Serbian and Montenegrin controlled areas of concentration camps and detention centres, in pursuit of the abhorrent policy of "ethnic cleansing", considered a form of genocide. Strongly condemning Serbia and Montenegro and their surrogates in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for their continued non-compliance with all relevant United Nations resolutions, Deeply regretting that the sanctions imposed by the Security Council have not had the desired effect of halting the aggressive acts by Serbian and Montenegrin irregular forces and the direct and indirect support of the Yugoslav People's Army for the aggressive acts in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
30. From at least March 1991 until 15 June 1992, Slobodan Milosevic exercised control over the four members of the "Serbian Bloc" within the Presidency of the SFRY (later the FRY). These four individuals were Borisav Jovic, the representative of the Republic of Serbia; Branko Kostic, the representative of the Republic of Montenegro; Jugoslav Kostic, the representative of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina; and Sejdo Bajramovic, the representative of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia. Slobodan Milosevic used Borisav Jovic and Branko Kostic as his primary agents in the Presidency, and through them, he directed the actions of the "Serbian Bloc". From 1 October 1991, in the absence of the representatives of the Presidency from Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the four members of the "Serbian Bloc" exercised the powers of the Presidency, including that of collective "Commander-in-Chief" of the JNA. This "Rump Presidency" acted without dissension to execute Slobodan Milosevic's policies. The Federal Presidency had effective control over the JNA as its "Commander-in-Chief" and the TO units and volunteer units acting in co-ordination and under supervision of the JNA. Generals Veljko Kadijevic and Blagoje Adzic, who directed and supervised the JNA forces in Croatia, were in constant communication and consultation with the accused.
1. Joint Criminal Enterprise [...] C. The implementation of the Strategic Plan in the Bosnian Krajina"