In Buddhism, the term anatt? (Pali) or an?tman (Sanskrit) refers to the doctrine of "non-self" - that no unchanging, permanent self or essence can be found in any phenomenon.[note 1] While many Buddhist traditions and scholars interpret it as a doctrine denying the existence of a self, some traditions and scholars describe anatt? as a strategy to attain non-attachment by recognizing everything as impermanent, while staying silent on the ultimate existence of an unchanging essence. In contrast, Hinduism asserts the existence of Atman as pure consciousness or witness-consciousness,[note 2] "reify[ing] consciousness as an eternal self."
Anatt? is a composite Pali word consisting of an (not, without) and att? (self-existent essence). The term refers to the central Buddhist insight that there is no phenomenon that has "self" or essence. It is one of the three characteristics of all existence, together with dukkha (suffering, dissatisfaction) and anicca (impermanence).[web 1]
Anatt? is synonymous with An?tman (an + ?tman) in Sanskrit Buddhist texts.[web 1] In some Pali texts, ?tman of Vedic texts is also referred to with the term Attan, with the sense of soul. An alternate use of Attan or Atta is "self, oneself, essence of a person", driven by the Vedic era Brahmanical belief that atman is the permanent, unchangeable essence of a living being, or the true self.
In Buddhism-related English literature, Anatt? is rendered as "not-Self", but this translation expresses an incomplete meaning, states Peter Harvey; a more complete rendering is "non-Self" because from its earliest days, Anatt? doctrine denies that there is anything called a 'Self' in any person or anything else, and that a belief in 'Self' is a source of Dukkha (suffering, pain, unsatisfactoriness).[note 3] It is also incorrect to translate Anatt? simply as "ego-less", according to Peter Harvey, because the Indian concept of ?tman and att? is different from the Freudian concept of ego.[note 4]
The concept of Anatt? appears in numerous Sutras of the ancient Buddhist Nik?ya texts (Pali canon). It appears, for example, as a noun in Samyutta Nikaya III.141, IV.49, V.345, in Sutta II.37 of Anguttara Nikaya, II.37-45 and II.80 of Patisambhidamagga, III.406 of Dhammapada. It also appears as an adjective, for example, in Samyutta Nikaya III.114, III.133, IV.28 and IV.130-166, in Sutta III.66 and V.86 of Vinaya. It is also found in the Dhammapada.
The ancient Buddhist texts discuss Att? or Attan (self), sometimes with alternate terms such as Atuman, Tuma, Puggala, Jiva, Satta, Pana and Nama-rupa, thereby providing the context for the Buddhist Anatt? doctrine. Examples of such Att? contextual discussions are found in Digha Nikaya I.186-187, Samyutta Nikaya III.179 and IV.54, Vinaya I.14, Majjhima Nikaya I.138, III.19, and III.265-271 and Anguttara Nikaya I.284. According to Steven Collins, the inquiry of anatt? and "denial of self" in the canonical Buddhist texts is "insisted on only in certain theoretical contexts", while they use the terms atta, purisa, puggala quite naturally and freely in various contexts. The elaboration of the anatt? doctrine, along with identification of the words such as "puggala" as "permanent subject or soul" appears in later Buddhist literature.
According to Collins, the Suttas present the doctrine in three forms. First, they apply the "no-self, no-identity" investigation to all phenomena as well as any and all objects, yielding the idea that "all things are not-self" (sabbe dhamma anatt?). Second, states Collins, the Suttas apply the doctrine to deny self of any person, treating conceit to be evident in any assertion of "this is mine, this I am, this is myself" (etam mamam eso 'ham asmi, eso me atta ti). Third, the Theravada texts apply the doctrine as a nominal reference, to identify examples of "self" and "not-self", respectively the Wrong view and the Right view; this third case of nominative usage is properly translated as "self" (as an identity) and is unrelated to "soul", states Collins. The first two usages incorporate the idea of soul.
Buddhist scholars Richard Gombrich and Alexander Wynne argue that the Buddha's descriptions of non-self in early Buddhist texts do not deny that there is a self. According to Gombrich, anatt? is often mistranslated as meaning "not having a self or essence", but actually means "is not ?tman" instead of "does not have ?tman." Wynne and Gombrich both argue that the Buddha's statements on anatt? were originally a "not-self" teaching that developed into a "no-self" teaching in later Buddhist thought. According to Wynne, early Buddhist texts such as the Anatt?lakkhana Sutta do not deny that there is a self, stating that the five aggregates that are described as not self are not descriptions of a human being but descriptions of the human experience. According to Johannes Bronkhorst, it is possible that "original Buddhism did not deny the existence of the soul", even though a firm Buddhist tradition has maintained that the Buddha avoided talking about the soul or even denied its existence.
French religion writer André Migot states that original Buddhism may not have taught a complete absence of self, pointing to evidence presented by Buddhist and Pali scholars Jean Przyluski and Caroline Rhys Davids that early Buddhism generally believed in a self, making Buddhist schools that admit an existence of a "self" not heretical, but conservative, adhering to ancient beliefs. While there may be ambivalence on the existence or non-existence of self in early Buddhist literature, Bronkhorst suggests that these texts clearly indicate that the Buddhist path of liberation consists not in seeking Atman-like self-knowledge, but in turning away from what might erroneously be regarded as the self. This is a reverse position to the Vedic traditions which recognized the knowledge of the self as "the principal means to achieving liberation."
According to Harvey, the contextual use of Att? in Nik?yas is two sided. In one, it directly denies that anything can be found called a self or soul in a human being that is a permanent essence of a human being, a theme found in Brahmanical (Ancient Hindu) traditions. In another, states Peter Harvey, such as at Samyutta Nikaya IV.286, the Sutta considers the materialistic concept in pre-Buddhist Vedic times of "no afterlife, complete annihilation" at death to be a denial of Self, but still "tied up with belief in a Self". "Self exists" is a false premise, assert the early Buddhist texts. However, adds Peter Harvey, these texts do not admit the premise "Self does not exist" either because the wording presumes the concept of "Self" prior to denying it; instead, the early Buddhist texts use the concept of Anatt? as the implicit premise.
According to Peter Harvey, while the Suttas criticize notions of an eternal, unchanging Self as baseless, they see an enlightened being as one whose empirical self is highly developed. This is paradoxical, states Harvey, in that "the Self-like nibbana state" is a mature self that knows "everything as Selfless". The "empirical self" is the citta (mind/heart, mindset, emotional nature), and the development of self in the Suttas is the development of this citta.
One with "great self", state the early Buddhist Suttas, has a mind which is neither at the mercy of outside stimuli nor its own moods, neither scattered nor diffused, but imbued with self-control, and self-contained towards the single goal of nibbana and a 'Self-like' state. This "great self" is not yet an Arahat, because he still does small evil action which leads to karmic fruition, but he has enough virtue that he does not experience this fruition in hell.
An Arahat, states Harvey, has a fully enlightened state of empirical self, one that lacks the "sense of both 'I am' and 'this I am'", which are illusions that the Arahat has transcended. The Buddhist thought and salvation theory emphasizes a development of self towards a Selfless state not only with respect to oneself, but recognizing the lack of relational essence and Self in others, wherein states Martijn van Zomeren, "self is an illusion".
1. identity view (Anatman)
up to seven rebirths in
once more as
4. sensual desire
once more in
6. material-rebirth desire
The Buddha emphasized both karma and anatt? doctrines. The Buddha criticized the doctrine that posited an unchanging essence as a subject as the basis of rebirth and karmic moral responsibility, which he called "atthikav?da". He also criticized the materialistic doctrine that denied the existence of both soul and rebirth, and thereby denied karmic moral responsibility, which he calls "natthikav?da". Instead, the Buddha asserted that there is no essence, but there is rebirth for which karmic moral responsibility is a must. In the Buddha's framework of karma, right view and right actions are necessary for liberation.
Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism all assert a believe in rebirth, and emphasize moral responsibility in a way different from pre-Buddhist materialistic schools of Indian philosophies. The materialistic schools of Indian philosophies, such as Charvaka, are called annihilationist schools because they posited that death is the end, there is no afterlife, no soul, no rebirth, no karma, and death is that state where a living being is completely annihilated, dissolved.
Buddha criticized the materialistic annihilationism view that denied rebirth and karma, states Damien Keown. Such beliefs are inappropriate and dangerous, stated Buddha, because they encourage moral irresponsibility and material hedonism. Anatt? does not mean there is no afterlife, no rebirth or no fruition of karma, and Buddhism contrasts itself to annihilationist schools. Buddhism also contrasts itself to other Indian religions that champion moral responsibility but posit eternalism with their premise that within each human being there is an essence or eternal soul, and this soul is part of the nature of a living being, existence and metaphysical reality.
Theravada Buddhism scholars, states Oliver Leaman, consider the Anatt? doctrine as one of the main theses of Buddhism. The Buddhist denial of a self is what distinguishes Buddhism from major religions of the world such as Christianity and Hinduism, giving it uniqueness, asserts the Theravada tradition. With the doctrine of Anatt?, stands or falls the entire Buddhist structure, asserts Nyanatiloka.
According to Collins, "insight into the teaching of anatt? is held to have two major loci in the intellectual and spiritual education of an individual" as s/he progresses along the Path. The first part of this insight is to avoid sakkayaditthi (Personality Belief), that is converting the "sense of I which is gained from introspection and the fact of physical individuality" into a theoretical belief in a self. "A belief in a (really) existing body" is considered a false belief and a part of the Ten Fetters that must be gradually lost. The second loci is the psychological realization of anatt?, or loss of "pride or conceit". This, states Collins, is explained as the conceit of asmimana or "I am"; (...) what this "conceit" refers to is the fact that for the unenlightened man, all experience and action must necessarily appear phenomenologically as happening to or originating from an "I". When a Buddhist gets more enlightened, this happening to or originating in an "I" or sakkdyaditthi is less. The final attainment of enlightenment is the disappearance of this automatic but illusory "I".
The Theravada tradition has long considered the understanding and application of the Anatt? doctrine to be a complex teaching, whose "personal, introjected application has always been thought to be possible only for the specialist, the practising monk". The tradition, states Collins, has "insisted fiercely on anatt? as a doctrinal position", while in practice it may not play much of a role in the daily religious life of most Buddhists. The Theravada doctrine of Anatt?, or not-self not-soul, inspire meditative practices for monks, states Donald Swearer, but for the lay Theravada Buddhists in Southeast Asia, the doctrines of kamma, rebirth and punna (merit) inspire a wide range of ritual practices and ethical behavior.
The Anatt? doctrine is key to the concept of nirvana (nibbana) in the Theravada tradition. The liberated nirvana state, states Collins, is the state of Anatt?, a state that is neither universally applicable nor can be explained, but can be realized.[note 8]
The dispute about "self" and "not-self" doctrines has continued throughout the history of Buddhism. In Thai Theravada Buddhism, for example, states Paul Williams, some modern era Buddhist scholars have claimed that "nirvana is indeed the true Self", while other Thai Buddhists disagree. For instance, the Dhammakaya tradition in Thailand teaches that it is erroneous to subsume nirvana under the rubric of anatt? (non-self); instead, nirvana is taught to be the "true self" or dhammakaya. The Dhammakaya tradition teaching that nirvana is atta, or true self, was criticized as heretical in Buddhism in 1994 by Ven. Payutto, a well-known scholar monk, who stated that 'Buddha taught nibbana as being non-self". The abbot of one major temple in the Dhammakaya tradition, Luang Por Sermchai of Wat Luang Por Sodh Dhammakayaram, argues that it tends to be scholars who hold the view of absolute non-self, rather than Buddhist meditation practitioners. He points to the experiences of prominent forest hermit monks such as Luang Pu Sodh and Ajahn Mun to support the notion of a "true self". Similar interpretations on the "true self" were put forth earlier by the 12th Supreme Patriarch of Thailand in 1939. According to Williams, the Supreme Patriarch's interpretation echoes the tath?gatagarbha sutras.
Several notable teachers of the Thai Forest Tradition have also described ideas in contrast to absolute non-self. Ajahn Maha Bua, a well known meditation master, described the citta (mind) as being an indestructible reality that does not fall under anatt?. He has stated that not-self is merely a perception that is used to pry one away from infatuation with the concept of a self, and that once this infatuation is gone the idea of not-self must be dropped as well. American monk Thanissaro Bhikkhu of the Thai Forest Tradition describes the Buddha's statements on non-self as a path to awakening rather than a universal truth. Bhikkhu Bodhi authored a rejoinder to Thanissaro, stating that "The reason the teaching of anatt? can serve as a strategy of liberation is precisely because it serves to rectify a misconception about the nature of being, hence an ontological error." Thanissaro Bhikkhu also states that the Buddha intentionally set aside the question of whether or not there is a self as a useless question, and goes on to call the phrase "there is no self" the "granddaddy of fake Buddhist quotes". He points out that clinging to the idea that there is no self at all would actually prevent enlightenment. Thanissaro Bhikkhu points to the Ananda Sutta (SN 44.10), where the Buddha stays silent when asked whether there is a 'self' or not, as a major cause of the dispute.
Anatt? is one of the main bedrock doctrines of Buddhism, and its discussion is found in the later texts of all Buddhist traditions.
The early Mahayana Buddhism texts link their discussion of "emptiness" (shunyata) to Anatt? and Nirvana. They do so, states Mun-Keat Choong, in three ways: first, in the common sense of a monk's meditative state of emptiness; second, with the main sense of Anatt? or 'everything in the world is empty of self'; third, with the ultimate sense of Nirvana or realization of emptiness and thus an end to rebirth cycles of suffering. The Anatt? doctrine is another aspect of shunyata, its realization is the nature of the nirvana state and to an end to rebirths.
Nagarjuna, the founder of Madhyamaka (middle way) school of Mahayana Buddhism, analyzed dharma first as factors of experience. He, states David Kalupahana, analyzed how these experiences relate to "bondage and freedom, action and consequence", and thereafter analyzed the notion of personal self (att?, ?tman).
The Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna (~200 CE), extensively wrote about rejecting the metaphysical entity called att? or ?tman (self, soul), asserting in chapter 18 of his M?lamadhyamakak?rik? that there is no such substantial entity and that "Buddha taught the doctrine of no-self".
Nagarjuna asserted that the notion of a self is associated with the notion of one's own identity and corollary ideas of pride, selfishness and a sense of psychophysical personality. This is all false, and leads to bondage in his Madhyamaka thought. There can be no pride nor possessiveness, in someone who accepts Anatt? and denies "self" which is the sense of personal identity of oneself, others or anything, states Nagarjuna. Further, all obsessions are avoided when a person accepts emptiness (sunyata). Nagarjuna denied there is anything called a self-nature as well as other-nature, emphasizing true knowledge to be comprehending emptiness. Anyone who has not dissociated from his belief in personality in himself or others, through the concept of self, is in a state of Avidya (ignorance) and caught in the cycle of rebirths and redeaths.
The texts attributed to the 5th-century Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu of the Yogachara school similarly discuss Anatt? as a fundamental premise of the Buddha. The Vasubandhu interpretations of no-self thesis were challenged by the 7th-century Buddhist scholar Candrakirti, who then offered his own theories on its importance.
Some 1st-millennium CE Buddhist texts suggest concepts that have been controversial because they imply a "self-like" concept. In particular are the Tath?gatagarbha s?tras, where the title itself means a garbha (womb, matrix, seed) containing Tathagata (Buddha). These Sutras suggest, states Paul Williams, that "all sentient beings contain a Tathagata" as their "essence, core or essential inner nature". The Tathagatagarbha doctrine, at its earliest probably appeared about the later part of the 3rd century CE, and is verifiable in Chinese translations of 1st millennium CE. Most scholars consider the Tathagatagarbha doctrine of an "essential nature" in every living being is equivalent to "Self",[note 9] and it contradicts the Anatt? doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist texts, leading scholars to posit that the Tathagatagarbha Sutras were written to promote Buddhism to non-Buddhists.
The Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra explicitly asserts that the Buddha used the term "Self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics. The Ratnagotravibh?ga (also known as Uttaratantra), another text composed in the first half of 1st millennium CE and translated into Chinese in 511 CE, points out that the teaching of the Tathagatagarbha doctrine is intended to win sentient beings over to abandoning "self-love" (atma-sneha) - considered to be one of the defects by Buddhism. The 6th-century Chinese Tathagatagarbha translation states that "Buddha has shiwo (True Self) which is beyond being and nonbeing". However, the Ratnagotravibh?ga asserts that the "Self" implied in Tathagatagarbha doctrine is actually "not-Self".
According to some scholars, the Buddha-nature discussed in these sutras does not represent a substantial self; rather, it is a positive language and expression of nyat? "emptiness" and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. Other scholars do in fact detect leanings towards monism in these tathagatagarbha references. Michael Zimmermann sees the notion of an unperishing and eternal self in the Tathagatagarbha Sutra. Zimmermann also avers that "the existence of an eternal, imperishable self, that is, buddhahood, is definitely the basic point of the Tathagatagarbha Sutra". He further indicates that there is no evident interest found in this sutra in the idea of Emptiness (sunyata). Williams states that the "Self" in Tathagatagarbha Sutras is actually "non-Self", and neither identical nor comparable to the Hindu concepts of Brahman and Self.
The Anatt? or Anatman doctrine is extensively discussed in and partly inspires the ritual practices of the Vajrayana tradition. The Tibetan terms such as bdag med refer to "without a self, insubstantial, anatman". These discussions, states Jeffrey Hopkins, assert the "non-existence of a permanent, unitary and independent self", and attribute these ideas to the Buddha.
The ritual practices in Vajrayana Buddhism employs the concept of deities, to end self-grasping, and to manifest as a purified, enlightened deity as part of the Vajrayana path to liberation from rebirths. One such deity is goddess Nairatmya (literally, non-soul, non-self). She symbolizes, states Miranda Shaw, that "self is an illusion" and "all beings and phenomenal appearances lack an abiding self or essence" in Vajrayana Buddhism.
In Hinduism, Atman refers to the essence of human beings, the observing pure consciousness or witness-consciousness. It is unaffected by ego, distinct from the individual being (jivanatman) embedded in material reality, and characterized by Ahamkara ('I-making'), mind (citta, manas), and all the defiling kleshas (impurities). Embodied personality changes over time, while Atman doesn't.
According to Jayatilleke, the Upanishadic inquiry fails to find an empirical correlate of the assumed Atman, but nevertheless assumes its existence, and Advaitins "reify consciousness as an eternal self." In contrast, the Buddhist inquiry "is satisfied with the empirical investigation which shows that no such Atman exists because there is no evidence" states Jayatilleke. According to Harvey, in Buddhism the negation of temporal existents is applied even more rigorous than in the Upanishads:
While the Upanishads recognized many things as being not-Self, they felt that a real, true Self could be found. They held that when it was found, and known to be identical to Brahman, the basis of everything, this would bring liberation. In the Buddhist Suttas, though, literally everything is seen is non-Self, even Nirvana. When this is known, then liberation - Nirvana - is attained by total non-attachment. Thus both the Upanishads and the Buddhist Suttas see many things as not-Self, but the Suttas apply it, indeed non-Self, to everything.
Both Buddhism and Hinduism distinguish ego-related "I am, this is mine", from their respective abstract doctrines of "Anatt?" and "Atman". This, states Peter Harvey, may have been an influence of Buddhism on Hinduism.
The term niratman appears in the Maitrayaniya Upanishad of Hinduism, such as in verses 6.20, 6.21 and 7.4. Niratman literally means "selfless". The niratman concept has been interpreted to be analogous to anatman of Buddhism. The ontological teachings, however, are different. In the Upanishad, states Thomas Wood, numerous positive and negative descriptions of various states - such as niratman and sarvasyatman (the self of all) - are used in Maitrayaniya Upanishad to explain the nondual concept of the "highest Self". According to Ramatirtha, states Paul Deussen, the niratman state discussion is referring to stopping the recognition of oneself as an individual soul, and reaching the awareness of universal soul or the metaphysical Brahman.
The Greek philosopher Pyrrho traveled to India as part of Alexander the Great's entourage where he was influenced by the Indian gymnosophists, which inspired him to create the philosophy of Pyrrhonism. Philologist Christopher Beckwith has demonstrated that Pyrrho based his philosophy on his translation of the three marks of existence into Greek, and that adiaphora (not logically differentiable, not clearly definable, negating Aristotle's use of "diaphora") reflects Pyrrho's understanding of the Buddhist concept of anatt?.
"Monks, this Teaching so well proclaimed by me, is plain, open, explicit, free of patchwork. In this Teaching that is so well proclaimed by me and is plain, open, explicit and free of patchwork; for those who are arahants, free of taints, who have accomplished and completed their task, have laid down the burden, achieved their aim, severed the fetters binding to existence, who are liberated by full knowledge, there is no (future) round of existence that can be ascribed to them. - Majjhima Nikaya i.130 ¶ 42, Translated by Nyanaponika Thera (Nyanaponika, 2006)
Harvey, Peter (2013b). The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism. Routledge. pp. 34, 38. ISBN 978-1-136-78336-4.