(10 April 1941 - 8 May 1945)
|Founded||7 January 1929 (de jure)|
1930 (de facto)
|Banned||8 May 1945|
|Preceded by||Party of Rights|
|Succeeded by|| • Crusaders|
• Croatian Liberation Movement
• Other groups[a]
|Youth wing||Usta?e Youth (UM)|
|Membership||100,000 (c. 1941)|
|Slogan||"Za dom spremni"|
("For the home - Ready!")
The Usta?a - Croatian Revolutionary Movement (Croatian: Usta?a - Hrvatski revolucionarni pokret), commonly known as Usta?e (pronounced [ûsta?e]) or by anglicised versions Ustasha or Ustashe,[b] was a Croatian fascist, and ultranationalist organization active, as one organization, between 1929 and 1945. Its members murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Jews, and Roma as well as political dissidents in Yugoslavia during World War II.
Much of the ideology of the Usta?e was based on Nazi racial theory. Like the Nazis, the Usta?e deemed Jews, Romani, and Slavs to be sub-humans (Untermenschen). They endorsed the claims from German racial theorists that Croats were not Slavs but a Germanic race. Their genocides against Serbs, against the Jews, and against the Romani were thus expressions of Nazi racial ideology. However, the Usta?e viewed the Bosniaks as "Muslim Croats," not Slavs, and as a result did not persecute Muslim Bosniaks on the basis of race.
In addition to Nazi racial theory, the Usta?e ideology incorporated fascism, Roman Catholicism and Croatian nationalism. The Usta?e supported the creation of a Greater Croatia that would span the Drina River and extend to the border of Belgrade. The movement emphasized the need for a racially "pure" Croatia and promoted genocide against Serbs, Jews and Romani people, and persecution of anti-fascist or dissident Croats and Bosniaks.
The Usta?e espoused Roman Catholicism and Islam as the religions of the Croats and Bosniaks and condemned Orthodox Christianity, which was the main religion of the Serbs. Roman Catholicism was identified with Croatian nationalism, while Islam, which had a large following in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was praised by the Usta?e as the religion that "keeps true the blood of Croats."
It was founded as a nationalist organization that sought to create an independent Croatian state. When the Usta?e came to power in the NDH, a quasi-protectorate puppet state established by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany during World War II, its military wings became the Army of the Independent State of Croatia and the Usta?e militia (Croatian: Usta?ka vojnica). However, the Usta?e lacked support among ordinary Croats and never accrued any significant support among the populace. The Usta?e regime was backed by parts of the Croatian population that during the interwar period had felt oppressed in the Serbian-led Yugoslavia. Most of the support it had initially gained by creating a Croat national state was lost because of the brutal practices it used.
The movement functioned as a terrorist organization before World War II but in April 1941, they were appointed to rule a part of Axis-occupied Yugoslavia as the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), which has been described as both an Italian-German quasi-protectorate, and as a puppet state of Nazi Germany.
The word usta?a (plural: usta?e) is derived from the intransitive verb ustati (Croatian for rise up). "Pu?ki-usta?a" (German: Landsturm) was a military rank in the Imperial Croatian Home Guard (1868-1918). The same term was the name of Croatian third-class infantry regiments (German: Landsturm regiments) during World War I (1914-1918). Another variation of the word ustati is ustanik (plural: ustanici) which means an insurgent, or a rebel. The name usta?a did not have fascist connotations during the early years of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as the term "ustat" was itself used in Herzegovina to denote the insurgents from the Herzegovinian rebellion of 1875. The full original name of the organization appeared in April 1931 as the Usta?a - Hrvatska revolucionarna organizacija or UHRO (Usta?a - Croatian Revolutionary Organization); in 1933 it was renamed the Usta?a - Hrvatski revolucionarni pokret (Usta?a - Croatian Revolutionary Movement), a name it kept until World War II. In English, Ustasha, Ustashe, Ustashas and Ustashi are used for the movement or its members.
One of the major ideological influences on the Croatian nationalism of the Usta?e was 19th century Croatian activist Ante Star?evi?, an advocate of Croatian unity and independence, who was both anti-Habsburg and anti-Serbian in outlook.
He envisioned the creation of a Greater Croatia that would include territories inhabited by Bosniaks, Serbs, and Slovenes, considering Bosniaks and Serbs to be Croats who had been converted to Islam and Orthodox Christianity, while considering the Slovenes to be "mountain Croats". Star?evi? argued that the large Serb presence in territories claimed by a Greater Croatia was the result of recent settlement, encouraged by Habsburg rulers, and the influx of groups like Vlachs who took up Orthodox Christianity and identified themselves as Serbs. Star?evi? admired Bosniaks because in his view they were Croats who had adopted Islam in order to preserve the economic and political autonomy of Bosnia and Croatia under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.
The Usta?e used Star?evi?'s theories to promote the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia and recognized Croatia as having two major ethnocultural components: Catholics and Muslims. The Usta?e sought to represent Star?evi? as being connected to their views. Josip Frank seceded his extreme fraction from Star?evi?'s party and formed his own the Pure Party of Rights, which became the main pool of members of the subsequent Usta?e movement. Historian John Paul Newman stated that Austro-Hungarian officers' "unfaltering opposition to Yugoslavia provided a blueprint for the Croatian radical right, the Usta?e".
The Usta?e promoted the theories of Dr Milan ?ufflay, who is believed to have claimed that Croatia had been "one of the strongest ramparts of Western civilization for many centuries", which he claimed had been lost through its union with Serbia when the nation of Yugoslavia was formed in 1918. ?ufflay was killed in Zagreb in 1931 by government supporters.
The Usta?e accepted the 1935 thesis by a Franciscan friar, Father Krunoslav Draganovi?, who claimed that many Catholics in southern Herzegovina had been converted to Orthodox Christianity in the 16th and 17th centuries, in order to justify a policy of forcible conversion of Orthodox Christians in the area to Catholicism.
The Usta?e were heavily influenced by Nazism and fascism. Paveli?'s position of Poglavnik was based on the similar positions of Duce held by Benito Mussolini and Führer held by Adolf Hitler. The Usta?e, like fascists, promoted a corporatist economy. Paveli? and the Usta?e were allowed sanctuary in Italy by Mussolini after being exiled from Yugoslavia. Paveli? had been in negotiations with Fascist Italy since 1927 that included advocating a territory-for-sovereignty swap in which he would tolerate Italy annexing its claimed territory in Dalmatia in exchange for Italy supporting the sovereignty of an independent Croatia.
Mussolini's support of the Usta?e was based on pragmatic considerations, such as maximizing Italian influence in the Balkans and the Adriatic. After 1937, with the weakening of French influence in Europe following Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland and with the rise of a quasi-fascist government in Yugoslavia under Milan Stojadinovi?, Mussolini abandoned support for the Usta?e from 1937 to 1939 and sought to improve relations with Yugoslavia, fearing that continued hostility towards Yugoslavia would result in Yugoslavia entering Germany's sphere of influence.
The collapse of the quasi-fascist Stojadinovi? regime resulted in Italy restoring its support for the Usta?e, whose aim was to create an independent Croatia in personal union with Italy. However, distrust of the Usta?e grew. Mussolini's son-in-law and Italian foreign minister Count Galeazzo Ciano noted in his diary that "The Duce is indignant with Paveli?, because he claims that the Croats are descendants of the Goths. This will have the effect of bringing them into the German orbit".
Hungary strongly supported the Usta?e for two aims. One, in order to weaken Yugoslavia, Little Entente, in order to ultimately regain some of its lost territories. The other, Hungary also wished to establish later in the future a strong alliance with the Independent State of Croatia and possibly enter a personal union.
Nazi Germany initially didn't support an independent Croatia, nor did it support the Usta?e, with Hitler stressing the importance of a "strong and united Yugoslavia". Nazi officials, including Hermann Göring, wanted Yugoslavia stable and officially neutral during the war so Germany could continue to securely gain Yugoslavia's raw material exports. The Nazis grew irritated with the Usta?e, among them Reichsfuhrer SS Heinrich Himmler, who was dissatisfied with the lack of full compliance by the NDH to the Nazis' agenda of extermination of the Jews, as the Usta?e permitted Jews who converted to Catholicism to be recognized as "honorary Croats", thus putatively exempt from persecution.
In 1932, an editorial in the first issue of the Usta?e newspaper, signed by the Usta?e leader Ante Paveli?, proclaimed that violence and terror would be the main means for the Usta?e to attain their goals:
The KNIFE, REVOLVER, MACHINE GUN and TIME BOMB; these are the idols, these are bells that will announce the dawning and THE RESURRECTION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA.
In 1933, the Usta?e presented "The Seventeen Principles" that formed the official ideology of the movement. The Principles stated the uniqueness of the Croatian nation, promoted collective rights over individual rights and declared that people who were not Croat by "blood" would be excluded from political life.
Those considered "undesirables" were subjected to mass murder. These principles called for the creation of a new economic system that would be neither capitalist nor communist and which emphasized the importance of the Roman Catholic Church and the patriarchial family as means to maintain social order and morality. (The name given by modern historian to this particular aspect of Usta?e ideology varies; "national Catholicism", "political Catholicism" and "Catholic Croatism" have been proposed among others.) In power, the Usta?e banned contraception and tightened laws against blasphemy.
The Usta?e accepted that Croats are part of the Dinaric race, but rejected the idea that Croats are primarily Slavic, claiming they are primarily descended from Germanic roots with the Goths. The Usta?e believed that a government must naturally be strong and authoritarian. The movement opposed parliamentary democracy for being "corrupt" and Marxism and Bolshevism for interfering in family life and the economy and for their materialism. The Usta?e considered competing political parties and elected parliaments to be harmful to its own interests.
The Usta?e recognized both Roman Catholicism and Islam as national religions of the Croatian people but initially rejected Orthodox Christianity as being incompatible with their objectives. Although the Usta?e emphasized religious themes, it stressed that duty to the nation took precedence over religious custom.
In power, the Usta?e banned the use of the term "Serbian Orthodox faith", requiring "Greek-Eastern faith" in its place. The Usta?e forcefully converted many Orthodox to Catholicism, murdered and expelled 85% of Orthodox priests, and plundered and burnt many Orthodox Christian churches. The Usta?e also persecuted Old Catholics who did not recognize papal infallibility. On 2 July 1942 the Croatian Orthodox Church was founded, as a further means to destroy the Serbian Orthodox Church, but this new Church gained very few followers.
The Usta?e attached conditions to the Croatian citizenship of Muslims, such as asserting that a Muslim who supported Yugoslavia would not be considered a Croat nor a citizen but would instead be considered a "Muslim Serb" who could be denied property and imprisoned. The Usta?e claimed that such "Muslim Serbs" had to earn Croat status.
While initial focus was against Serbs, as the Usta?e grew closer to the Nazis they adopted antisemitism. In 1936, in "The Croat Question", Ante Paveli? placed Jews third among "the Enemies of the Croats" (after Serbs and Freemasons, but before Communists): writing:
?Today, practically all finance and nearly all commerce in Croatia is in Jewish hands. This became possible only through the support of the state, which thereby seeks, on one hand, to strengthen the pro-Serbian Jews, and on the other, to weaken Croat national strength. The Jews celebrated the establishment of the so-called Yugoslav state with great joy, because a national Croatia could never be as useful to them as a multi-national Yugoslavia; for in national chaos lies the power of the Jews... In fact, as the Jews had foreseen, Yugoslavia became, in consequence of the corruption of official life in Serbia, a true Eldorado of Jewry."
Once in power, the Usta?e immediately introduced a series of Nazi-style Racial Laws. On 30 April 1941, the Usta?e proclaimed the "Legal Decree on Racial Origins" the "Legal Decree on the Protection of Aryan Blood and the Honor of the Croatian People", and the "Legal Provision on Citizenship". These decrees defined who was a Jew, and took away the citizenship rights of all non-Aryans, i.e. Jews and Roma. By the end of April 1941, months before the Nazis implemented similar measures in Germany and over a year after being implemented in occupied Poland, the Usta?e required all Jews to wear insignia, typically a yellow Star of David. The Usta?e declared the "Legal Provision on the Nationalization of the Property of Jews and Jewish Companies", on 10 October 1941, and with it they confiscated all Jewish property.
Already on their first day, 10-11 April 1941, Usta?e arrested a group of prominent Zagreb Jews and held them for ransom. On 13 April the same was done in Osijek, where Usta?e and Volksdeutscher mobs also destroyed the synagogue and Jewish graveyard. This process was repeated multiple times in 1941 with groups of Jews. Simultaneously, the Usta?e initiated extensive antisemitic propaganda, with Usta?e papers writing that Croatians must "be more alert than any other ethnic group to protect their racial purity, ... We need to keep our blood clean of the Jews". They also wrote that Jews are synonymous with "treachery, cheating, greed, immorality and foreigness", and therefore "wide swaths of the Croatian people always despised the Jews and felt towards them natural revulsion".
In May 1941, the Usta?e rounded up 165 Jewish youth in Zagreb, members of the Jewish sports club Makabi, and sent them to the Danica concentration camp (all but 3 were later killed by the Usta?e). The Usta?e sent most Jews to Usta?e and Nazi concentration camps--including the notorious, Usta?e-run, Jasenovac--where all told nearly, 32,000, or 80% of the Jews in the Independent State of Croatia, were exterminated. In October 1941, the Usta?e mayor of Zagreb ordered the demolition of the Zagreb Synagogue, which was completely demolished by April 1942. The Usta?e persecuted Jews who practiced Judaism but authorized Jewish converts to Catholicism to be recognized as Croatian citizens and be given honorary Aryan citizenship that allowed them to be reinstated at the jobs from which they had previously been separated. After they stripped Jews of their citizenship rights, the Usta?e allowed some to apply for Aryan rights via bribes and/or through connections to prominent Usta?e. The whole process was highly arbitrary. Only 2% of Zagreb's Jews were granted Aryan rights, for example. Also, Aryan rights did not guarantee permanent protection from being sent to concentration camps or other persecution.
Economically, the Usta?e supported the creation of a corporatist economy. The movement believed that natural rights existed to private property and ownership over small-scale means of production free from state control. Armed struggle, revenge and terrorism were glorified by the Usta?e.
The Usta?e introduced widespread measures, to which many Croats themselves fell victim. Jozo Tomasevich in his book War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: 1941-1945, states that "never before in history had Croats been exposed to such legalized administrative, police and judicial brutality and abuse as during the Usta?a regime." Decrees enacted by the regime formed the basis that allowed it to get rid of all unwanted employees in state and local government and in state enterprises, the "unwanted" being all Jews, Serbs and Yugoslav-oriented Croats who were all thrown out except for some deemed specifically needed by the government. This would leave a multitude of jobs to be filled by Usta?es and pro-Usta?e adherents, and would lead to government jobs being filled by people with no professional qualifications.
During the 1920s, Ante Paveli?, lawyer, politician and one of the followers Frank's party, became the leading advocate of Croatian independence. In 1927, he secretly contacted Benito Mussolini, dictator of Italy and founder of fascism, and presented his separatist ideas to him. Paveli? proposed an independent Greater Croatia that should cover the entire historical and ethnic area of the Croats. Historian Rory Yeomans claimed that there are indication that Paveli? had been considering the formation of some kind of nationalist insurgency group as early as 1928.
In October 1928, after the assassination of leading Croatian politician Stjepan Radi?, Croatian Peasant Party President in the Yugoslav Assembly by radical Montenegrin politician Puni?a Ra?i?, a youth group named the Croat Youth Movement was founded by Branimir Jeli? at the University of Zagreb. A year later Ante Paveli? was invited by the 21-year-old Jeli? into the organization as a junior member. A related movement, the Domobranski Pokret--which had been the name of the legal Croatian army in Austria-Hungary--began publication of Hrvatski Domobran, a newspaper dedicated to Croatian national matters. The Usta?e sent Hrvatski Domobran to the United States to garner support for them from Croatian-Americans. The organization around the Domobran tried to engage with and radicalize moderate Croats, using Radi?'s assassination to stir up emotions within the divided country. By 1929 two divergent Croatian political streams had formed: those who supported Paveli?'s view that only violence could secure Croatia's national interests, and the Croatian Peasant Party, led then by Vladko Ma?ek, successor to Stjepan Radi?, which had much greater support among Croats.
Various members of the Croatian Party of Rights contributed to the writing of the Domobran, until around Christmas 1928 when the newspaper was banned by authorities of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In January 1929 the king banned all national parties, and the radical wing of the Party of Rights was exiled, including Paveli?, Jeli? and Gustav Per?ec. This group was later joined by several other Croatian exiles. On 22 March 1941 Zvonimir Pospi?il and Mijo Babi? murdered Toni ?legel, the chief editor of newspaper Novosti from Zagreb and president of Jugo?tampa, which was the beginning of the terrorist actions of Usta?e. On 20 April 1929 Paveli? and others co-signed a declaration in Sofia, Bulgaria, with members of the Macedonian National Committee, asserting that they would pursue "their legal activities for the establishment of human and national rights, political freedom and complete independence for both Croatia and Macedonia". The Court for the Preservation of the State in Belgrade sentenced Paveli? and Per?ec to death on 17 July 1929.
The exiles started organizing support for their cause among the Croatian diaspora in Europe, as well as North and South America. In January 1932 they named their revolutionary organization "Usta?a". The Usta?e carried out terrorist acts, to cause as much damage as possible to Yugoslavia. From their training camps in fascist Italy and Hungary, they planted time bombs on international trains bound for Yugoslavia, causing deaths and material damage. In November 1932 ten Usta?e, led by Andrija Artukovi? and supported by four local sympathizers, attacked a gendarme outpost at Bru?ani in the Lika/Velebit area, in an apparent attempt to intimidate the Yugoslav authorities. The incident has sometimes been termed the "Velebit uprising".
The Usta?e's most famous terrorist act was carried out on 9 October 1934, when working with the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), they assassinated King Alexander I of Yugoslavia. The perpetrator, a Bulgarian revolutionary, Vlado Chernozemski, was killed by French police. Three Usta?e members who had been waiting at different locations for the king--Mijo Kralj, Zvonimir Pospi?il and Milan Raji?--were captured and sentenced to life imprisonment by a French court.
Ante Paveli?, along with Eugen Kvaternik and Ivan Per?evi?, were subsequently sentenced to death in absentia by a French court, as the real organizers of the deed. The Usta?e believed that the assassination of King Alexander had effectively "broken the backbone of Yugoslavia" and that it was their "most important achievement."
Soon after the assassination, all organizations related to the Usta?e as well as the Hrvatski Domobran, which continued as a civil organization, were banned throughout Europe. Under pressure from France, the Italian police arrested Paveli? and several Usta?e emigrants in October 1934. Paveli? was imprisoned in Turin and released in March 1936. After he met with Eugen Dido Kvaternik, he stated that assassination was "the only language Serbs understand". While in prison, Paveli? was informed of the 1935 election in Yugoslavia, when the coalition led by Croat Vladko Ma?ek won. He stated that his victory was aided by the activity of Usta?e. By the mid-1930s, graffiti with the initials ?AP meaning "Long live Ante Paveli?" (Croatian: ?ivio Ante Paveli?) had begun to appear on the streets of Zagreb. During the 1930s, a split developed between the "home" Usta?e members who stayed behind in Croatia and Bosnia to struggle against Yugoslavia and the "emigre" Usta?e who went abroad. The "emigre" Usta?e who had a much lower educational level were viewed as violent, ignorant and fanatical by the "home" Usta?e while the "home" Usta?e were dismissed as "soft" by the "emigres" who saw themselves as a "warrior-elite".
After March 1937, when Italy and Yugoslavia signed a pact of friendship, Usta?e and their activities were banned, which attracted the attention of young Croats, especially university students, who would become sympathizers or members. In 1936, the Yugoslav government offered amnesty to those Usta?e abroad provided they promised to renounce violence; many of the "emigres" accepted the amnesty and returned home to continue the struggle. In the late 1930s, the Usta?e started to infiltrate the para-military organizations of the Croat Peasant Party, the Croatian Defense Force and the Peasant Civil Party. At the University of Zagreb, an Usta?e-linked student group become the largest single student group by 1939. In February 1939 two returnees from detention, Mile Budak and Ivan Or?ani?, became editors of Hrvatski narod, known in English as The Croatian Nation, a pro-Usta?e journal.
The Axis powers invaded Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941. Vladko Ma?ek, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), which was the most influential party in Croatia at the time, rejected German offers to lead the new government. On 10 April the most senior home-based Usta?e, Slavko Kvaternik, took control of the police in Zagreb and in a radio broadcast that day proclaimed the formation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Dr?ava Hrvatska, NDH). The name of the state was an attempt to capitalise on the Croat struggle for independence. Ma?ek issued a statement that day, calling on all Croatians to cooperate with the new authorities.[better source needed]
Meanwhile, Paveli? and several hundred Usta?e left their camps in Italy for Zagreb, where he declared a new government on 16 April 1941. He accorded himself the title of "Poglavnik"--a Croatian approximation to "Führer". The Independent State of Croatia was declared on Croatian "ethnic and historical territory", what is today Republic of Croatia (without Istria), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Syrmia and the Bay of Kotor. However, a few days after the declaration of independence, the Usta?e were forced to sign the Treaty of Rome where they surrendered part of Dalmatia and Krk, Rab, Kor?ula, Biograd, ?ibenik, Split, ?iovo, ?olta, Mljet and part of Konavle and the Bay of Kotor to Italy. De facto control over this territory varied for the majority of the war, as the Partisans grew more successful, while the Germans and Italians increasingly exercised direct control over areas of interest. The Germans and Italians split the NDH into two zones of influence, one in the southwest controlled by the Italians and the other in the northeast controlled by the Germans. As a result, the NDH has been described as "an Italian-German quasi-protectorate". In September 1943, after Italian capitulation, the NDH annexed the whole territory which was annexed by Italy according to Treaty of Rome.
The decline in support for the Usta?e regime among ethnic Croats of those initially for the government began with the ceding of Dalmatia to Italy, considered as the heartland of the state and worsened with the internal lawlessness from Usta?e persecutions.
The Army of the Independent State of Croatia was composed of enlistees who did not participate in Usta?e activities. The Usta?e Militia was organised in 1941 into five (later 15) 700-man battalions, two railway security battalions and the elite Black Legion and Poglavnik Bodyguard Battalion (later Brigade). They were predominantly recruited among uneducated population and working class.
On 27 April 1941 a newly formed unit of the Usta?e army killed members of the largely Serbian community of Gudovac, near Bjelovar. Eventually all who opposed and/or threatened the Usta?e were outlawed. The HSS was banned on 11 June 1941, in an attempt by the Usta?e to take their place as the primary representative of the Croatian peasantry. Vladko Ma?ek was sent to the Jasenovac concentration camp, but later released to serve a house arrest sentence due to his popularity among the people. Ma?ek was later again called upon by foreigners to take a stand and oppose the Paveli? government, but refused. In early 1941 Jews and Serbs were ordered to leave certain areas of Zagreb.
In the months after Independent State of Croatia has been established, most of Usta?e groups were not under centralized control: besides 4,500 regular Usta?e Corps troops, there was some 25,000-30,0000 "Wild Usta?e" (hrv. "divlje usta?e"), boosted by government-controlled press as "peasant Usta?e" "begging" to be sent to fight enemies of the regime. After mass crimes against Serb populace committed during the Summer months of 1941, the regime decided to blame all the atrocities to the irregular Usta?e--thoroughly undisciplined and paid for the service only with the booty; authorities even sentenced to death and executed publicly in August and September 1941 many of them for unauthorized use of extreme violence against Serbs and Gypsies. To put an end to Wild Usta?e uncontrolled looting and killing, the central government used some 6,000 gendarmes and some 45,000 newly recruited members of regular "Domobranstvo" forces.
Paveli? first met with Adolf Hitler on 6 June 1941. Mile Budak, then a minister in Paveli?'s government, publicly proclaimed the violent racial policy of the state on 22 July 1941. Vjekoslav "Maks" Luburi?, a chief of the secret police, started building concentration camps in the summer of the same year. Usta?e activities in villages across the Dinaric Alps led the Italians and the Germans to express their disquiet. According to writer/historian Sr?a Trifkovi?, as early as 10 July 1941 Wehrmacht Gen. Edmund Glaise von Horstenau reported the following to the German High Command, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW):
Our troops have to be mute witnesses of such events; it does not reflect well on their otherwise high reputation . . . I am frequently told that German occupation troops would finally have to intervene against Usta?e crimes. This may happen eventually. Right now, with the available forces, I could not ask for such action. Ad hoc intervention in individual cases could make the German Army look responsible for countless crimes which it could not prevent in the past.
Historian Jonathan Steinberg describes Usta?e crimes against Serbian and Jewish civilians: "Serbian and Jewish men, women and children were literally hacked to death". Reflecting on the photos of Usta?e crimes taken by Italians, Steinberg writes: "There are photographs of Serbian women with breasts hacked off by pocket knives, men with eyes gouged out, emasculated and mutilated".
Increased activity of the bands [of rebels] is chiefly due to atrocities carried out by Usta?e units in Croatia against the Orthodox population. The Usta?e committed their deeds in a bestial manner not only against males of conscript age, but especially against helpless old people, women and children. The number of the Orthodox that the Usta?e have massacred and sadistically tortured to death is about three hundred thousand.
In September 1942 an Usta?e Defensive Brigade was formed, and during 1943 the Usta?e battalions were re-organised into eight four-battalion brigades (1st to 8th). In 1943 the Germans suffered major losses on the Eastern Front and the Italians signed an armistice with the Allies, leaving behind significant caches of arms which the Partisans would use.
By 1944 Paveli? was almost totally reliant on Usta?e units, now 100,000 strong, formed in Brigades 1 to 20, Recruit Training Brigades 21 to 24, three divisions, two railway brigades, one defensive brigade and the new Mobile Brigade. In November 1944 the army was effectively put under Usta?e control when the Armed Forces of the Independent State of Croatia were combined with the units of the Usta?e to form 18 divisions, comprising 13 infantry, two mountain and two assault divisions and one replacement division, each with its own organic artillery and other support units. There were several armored units.
Fighting continued for a short while after the formal surrender of German Army Group E on 9 May 1945, as Paveli? ordered the NDH forces to attempt to escape to Austria, together with a large number of civilians. The Battle of Poljana, between a mixed German and Usta?e column and a Partisan force, was the last battle of World War II on European soil.[dubious ] Most of those fleeing, including both Usta?e and civilians, were handed over to the Partisans at Bleiburg and elsewhere on the Austrian border. Paveli? hid in Austria and Rome, with the help of Catholic clergy, later fleeing to Argentina.
After World War II, many of the Usta?e went underground or fled to countries such as Canada, Australia, Germany and some countries in South America, notably Argentina, with the assistance of Roman Catholic churches and their own grassroots supporters.
For several years some Usta?e tried to organize a resistance group called the Crusaders, but their efforts were largely foiled by the Yugoslav authorities. With the defeat of the Independent State of Croatia, the active movement went dormant. Infighting fragmented the surviving Usta?e. Paveli? formed the Croatian Liberation Movement, which drew in several of the former state's leaders. Vjekoslav Vran?i? founded a reformed Croatian Liberation Movement and was its leader. Maks Luburi? formed the Croatian National Resistance. Branimir Jeli? founded the Croatian National Committee.
The Usta?e intended to create an ethnically "pure" Croatia, and they viewed the Serbs living in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina as the biggest obstacle to this goal. Usta?e ministers Mile Budak, Mirko Puk and Milovan ?ani? declared in May 1941 that the goal of the new Usta?e policy was an ethnically pure Croatia. The strategy to achieve their goal was:
The NDH government cooperated with Nazi Germany in the Holocaust and exercised their own version of the genocide against Serbs, Jews and Roma (aka "gypsies") inside its borders. State policy towards Serbs had first been declared in the words of Milovan ?ani?, a minister of the NDH Legislative council, on 2 May 1941:
This country can only be a Croatian country, and there is no method we would hesitate to use in order to make it truly Croatian and cleanse it of Serbs, who have for centuries endangered us and who will endanger us again if they are given the opportunity.
The Usta?e enacted race laws patterned after those of the Third Reich, which persecuted Jews, Romani and Serbs, who were collectively declared to be enemies of the Croatian people. Serbs, Jews, Roma and Croatian and Bosniak dissidents, including Communists, were interned in concentration camps, the largest of which was Jasenovac. By the end of the war the Usta?e, under Paveli?'s leadership, had exterminated an estimated 30,000 Jews and 26-29,000 Roma, while the number of Serb victims ranges as low as 200,000 to as high as 500,000 with historians generally listing between 300,000 and 350,000 deaths.
The history textbooks in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cited 700,000 as the total number of victims at Jasenovac. This was promulgated from a 1946 calculation of the demographic loss of population (the difference between the actual number of people after the war and the number that would have been, had the pre-war growth trend continued). After that, it was used by Edvard Kardelj and Mo?a Pijade in the Yugoslav war reparations claim sent to Germany. In its entry on Jasenovac, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum says:
Determining the number of victims is highly problematic, due to the destruction of many relevant documents, the long-term inaccessibility to independent scholars of those documents that survived, and the ideological agendas of postwar partisan scholarship and journalism, which has been and remains influenced by ethnic tension, religious prejudice, and ideological conflict.The Usta?e murdered between 320,000 and 340,000 ethnic Serb residents of Croatia and Bosnia during the period of Usta?a rule; more than 30,000 Croatian Jews were killed either in Croatia or at Auschwitz-Birkenau.
The USHMM notes that estimates on the number of Serb victims, the Usta?e's primary victims, vary tremendously and that "the most reliable figures place the number between 330,000 and 390,000, with 45,000 to 52,000 Serbs murdered in Jasenovac."
The Jasenovac Memorial Area maintains a list of 83,145 names of Jasenovac victims that was gathered by government officials in Belgrade in 1964, as well as names and biographical data for the victims identified in recent inquiries. As the gathering process was imperfect, they estimated that the list represented between 60%-75% of the total victims, putting the number of killed in that complex at between roughly 80,000-100,000. The previous head of the Memorial Area Simo Brdar estimated at least 365,000 dead at Jasenovac. The analyses of statisticians Vladimir ?erjavi? and Bogoljub Ko?ovi? were similar to those of the Memorial Area. In all of Yugoslavia, the estimated number of Serb deaths was 487,000 according to Ko?ovi?, and 530,000 according to ?erjavi?, out of a total of 1.014 million or 1.027 million deaths (respectively). ?erjavi? further stated there were 197,000 Serb civilians killed in NDH (78,000 as prisoners in Jasenovac and elsewhere) as well as 125,000 Serb combatants.
The Belgrade Museum of Holocaust compiled a list of over 77,000 names of Jasenovac victims. It was previously headed by Milan Bulaji?, who supported the claim of a total of 700,000 victims. The current administration of the Museum has further expanded the list to include a bit over 80,000 names. During World War II various German military commanders and civilian authorities gave different figures for the number of Serbs, Jews and others killed inside the territory of the Independent State of Croatia. Historian Prof. Jozo Tomasevich has posited that some of these figures may have been a "deliberate exaggeration" fostered to create further hostility between Serbs and Croats so that they would not unite in resisting the Axis. These figures included 400,000 Serbs (Alexander Löhr); 500,000 Serbs (Lothar Rendulic); 250,000 to March 1943 (Edmund Glaise von Horstenau); more than "3/4 of a million Serbs" (Hermann Neubacher) in 1943; 600,000-700,000 in concentration camps until March 1944 (Ernst Fick); 700,000 (Massenbach).[unreliable source?]
The first group of camps was formed in the spring of 1941. These included:
These camps were closed by October 1942. The Jasenovac complex was built between August 1941 and February 1942. The first two camps, Krapje and Bro?ica, were closed in November 1941. The three newer camps continued to function until the end of the war:
There were also other camps in:
Numbers of prisoners:
Beyond mass killings in concentration camps, the Usta?e perpetrated many massacres of civilians in the field. The first mass killing of Serbs was carried out on 30 April 1941, when the Usta?e rounded up and killed 196 Serb villagers at Gudovac. Many other massacres soon followed, including at Blagaj, Glina, Korita, Nevesinje, Prebilovci, Metkovic, Oto?ac, Vo?in, ?argovac, etc. Here is how the Croatian Catholic Bishop of Mostar, Alojzije Mi?i?, described the mass killings of Serb civilians just in one small area of Herzegovina, just during the first 6 months of the war:
People were captured like beasts. Slaughtered, killed, thrown live into the abyss. Women, mothers with children, young women, girls and boys were thrown into pits. The vice-mayor of Mostar, Mr. Balji?, a Mohammedan, publicly states, although as an official he should be silent and not talk, that in Ljubinje alone 700 schismatics [i.e. Serb Orthodox Christians] were thrown into one pit. Six full train carriages of women, mothers and girls, children under age 10, were taken from Mostar and ?apljina to the ?urmanci station, where they were unloaded and taken into the hills, with live mothers and their children tossed down the cliffs. Everyone was tossed and killed. In the Klepci parish, from the surrounding villages, 3,700 schismatics were killed. Poor souls, they were calm. I will not enumerate further. I would go too far. In the city of Mostar, hundreds were tied up, taken outside the city and killed like animals.
German officers in Croatia and Bosnia repeatedly expressed abhorrence at Usta?e mass killings of Serbs, using words like "slaughter", "atrocities", "butchery" and "terror", while citing hundreds of thousands of victims. Thus Major Walter Kleinenberger, officer with the 714th division, complained that Usta?e brutality "was in defiance of all laws of civilization. The Usta?e murder without exception men, women and children". German Captain Konopatzki called the Usta?e Black Legion slaughter of Serb civilians in Eastern Bosnia "a new wave of butchery of innocents". Usta?e "wholesale butchery" (Abschlachtung) of Serbs in Srem, in ISC-occupied Serbia, triggered German concerns of Serb uprisings. Lieutenant Colonel von Wedel wrote that in western Bosnia Usta?e killed women and children "like cattle" in a series of "bestial executions". This is how Hitler's Plenipotentiary to Croatia, General von Horstanau, described the aftermath of slaughter committed by Jasenovac concentration camp guards in a nearby village: 
The German military even took the extraordinary step of trying the Usta?e chaplain, Miroslav Filipovi?, for the massacre of 2,300 civilians in 3 villages around Banja Luka in February 1942, including 52 children at a school. On March 3, 1943, General von Horstanau, wrote "Thus far 250,000 Serbs have been killed". General Lothar Renduli? wrote how in August 1942 he remarked to an Usta?e official that he could not conceive how 500,000 Serbs had been killed, to which the Usta?e replied "Half-a-million is a slanderous accusation, the number is not higher than 200,000". Other German sources put the total Serb victim numbers in the ISC, as high as 600,000 to 700,000.
As part of their policy to eliminate Serbs entirely, by killing one-third, converting one-third and expelling one-third, the Usta?e conducted forcible conversions of Christian Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism, with the participation of Catholic priests. On occasion they used the prospect of conversion as a means to gather Serbs together so they could kill them, which is what occurred at Glina. On 18 May 1943, Archbishop Stepinac wrote a letter to the pope, in which he estimated 240,000 conversions to date. The Usta?e killed 157 Orthodox priests, among them 3 Serb Orthodox bishops (cutting the throat of the bishop of Banja Luka and killing the archbishop of Sarajevo), while they jailed and tortured the Orthodox archbishop of Zagreb. The Usta?e expelled to Serbia 327 Orthodox priests and one bishop, while 2 other bishops and 12 priests left on their own.
Thus 85% of the Orthodox priests in the Independent State of Croatia were either killed or expelled by the Usta?e, in order to "leave the Orthodox population without spiritual leadership so the Usta?as' policy of forced or fear-induced conversions to Catholicism would be easier to carry out"  The Usta?e destroyed and desecrated numerous Orthodox Churches, forbade the Cyrillic script and Julian calendar (both used in the Orthodox Church), even prohibited the term "Serbian Orthodox Church". Orthodox schools were shut down, and the Church was prohibited from collecting contributions from believers, robbing it of income. Orthodox Church properties were confiscated by the Usta?e, some turned over to the Croatian Catholic Church. Finally, to destroy the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Usta?e tried to create its own alternative Croatian Orthodox Church with an imported Russian priest, but failed to gain adherents.
Despite these many actions by the Usta?e to destroy the Serbian Orthodox Church, the historian Jozo Tomasevich found no condemnations of these crimes, public or private, by Catholic Archbishop Stepinac or any other members of the Croatian Catholic Church. On the contrary, he states that this massive Usta?e attack on the Serbian Orthodox Church "was approved and supported by many Croatian Catholic priests", and that the Croatian Roman Catholic Church hierarchy and the Vatican "regarded Usta?e policies against the Serbs and Serbian Orthodox Church as advantageous to Roman Catholicism".
The historian Mark Biondich observes that the Catholic Church had historically been on the fringes of Croatian politics and public life, and that Church influence had further eroded during the interwar period due to the royal dictatorship and the popularity of the anti-clerical Croatian Peasant Party. During the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Catholic Clergy was deeply dissatisfied with the regime: "... a massive press campaign was launched to mobilize Croatia's nearly three million Catholics against the central government's measures penalizing Saint Peter's apostolate. First of all its inequality in treatment was denounced: 'the budget for religion totals 141 million dinars, 70 of which go to the Serbian Church, and 34 to the Catholic one.(...) Pa?i?'s government is kind in Serbia, where each citizen pays 55 dinars in yearly taxes, while it is cruel in Croatia and Slovenia, largely Catholic districts, where each citizen pays 165 dinars in taxes.'"
Croatian Catholic Church antagonism toward the Orthodox Church became an important part of Usta?e antagonism toward Serbs, with fateful consequences during the war. The Usta?e supported violent aggression or force to convert Serbo-Croatian speaking Orthodox believers to Roman Catholicism. The Usta?e held the position that Eastern Orthodoxy, as a symbol of Serbian nationalism, was their greatest foe and never recognized the existence of a Serb people on the territories of Croatia or Bosnia--they recognized only "Croats of the Eastern faith". Under the Usta?e policy of entirely eliminating Serbs, the Catholic Church in Croatia participated in the forced conversion of Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism. However, even conversion did not necessarily protect Serbs and Jews from slaughter. Bishop Alojzije Mi?i? of Mostar described how while Serb converts to Catholicism "were at Church attending holy Mass, they (Usta?e) seized them, the young and the old, men and women, drove them like cattle...and soon sent them to eternity, en masse"."
The Usta?e called Bosniaks "Croats of the Islamic faith" and in general tolerated Muslims; in turn the Bosniak community did not demonstrate any particular hostility to the Usta?e government. An important number of Muslim conscripts served in the armed forces of Independent State of Croatia, or in its police forces; only a very small number of Muslims served in the ranks of the communist Partisans until the closing days of the war.
On 28 April 1941, the head of the Catholic Church in Croatia, Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, issued a public letter in support of the new Independent State of Croatia (under Usta?e-led government), and asked the clergy to pray for its leader, Ante Paveli?. This despite the fact that the Usta?e had already proclaimed measures prohibiting Serbs, Jews and Gipsies to serve as policemen, judges and soldiers, and making easy for the state officials to fire members of those ethnic/religious groups from the public administration, and he knew they were preparing Nazi-style racial laws, which Paveli? signed only 2 days after.
While Stepinac later objected to certain Usta?e policies and helped some Jews and Serbs, he continued to publicly support the survival of Independent State of Croatia until its very end, served as the state's War Vicar, and in 1944 received a medal from Paveli?. During the ongoing war, Stepinac publicly objected Usta?e policies--in fact, as regards for the relations with head of the Usta?e regime Ante Paveli?, "it is generally agreed that they thoroughly hated each other... archbishop also opposed Fascist and Nazi ideologies, especially Nazi racist ideology, and many Ustasha policies", unlike some other members of the Croatian Catholic clergy. According to Historian Martin Gilbert, "Aloysius Stepinac, who in 1941 had welcomed Croat independence, subsequently condemned Croat atrocities against both Serbs and Jews, and himself saved a group of Jews in an old age home."
The vast majority of the Catholic clergy in Croatia supported the Usta?e at the moment they succeeded in forming Independent State of Croatia; but later when it was clear the Allies would win, the Catholic hierarchy tried to distance the Church from the regime which involved itself in various abuses and war crimes. Yet in its pastoral letter of 24 March 1945, the Croatian Catholic Church still proclaimed its support for the puppet state and its rulers, despite the fact that most senior regime figures were preparing to flee the country. The Catholic press also maintained its support of Paveli? right to the end, and Stepinac himself performed a final Te Deum to the NDH on the anniversary of its founding, on 10 April 1945, while the NDH was carrying out the final mass killings to liquidate the Jasenovac concentration camp.
Some priests, mostly Franciscans, particularly in, but not limited to, Herzegovina and Bosnia, took part in the atrocities themselves. Priests like Ivan Guberina served as Paveli?'s bodyguards, while Dionizije Juri?ev, responsible for the forced conversion of Serbs in the Usta?e government, wrote that it was no longer a crime to kill seven-year-olds if they stood in the way of the Usta?e movement. In his diocesan newspaper, the Archbishop of Sarajevo, Ivan ?ari?, published that the "liberation of the world from the Jews is a movement for the renewal of humanity". In Bosnia the Usta?e largely ruled through the Catholic clergy, with the priest Bo?idar Bralo serving as a chief Usta?e delegate for Bosnia.
Miroslav Filipovi? was a Franciscan friar (from the Petri?evac monastery) who allegedly joined the Usta?e as chaplain and, on 7 February 1942, joined in the massacre of roughly 2730 Serbs of the nearby villages, including some 500 children. He was allegedly subsequently dismissed from his order and defrocked, although he wore his clerical garb when he was hanged for war crimes. He became Chief Guard of Jasenovac concentration camp where he was nicknamed "Fra Sotona" (Father Satan) by fellow Croats. Mladen Lorkovi?, the Croat minister of foreign affairs, formulated it like this: "In Croatia, we can find few real Serbs. The majority of Pravoslavs are as a matter of fact Croats who were forced by foreign invaders to accept the infidel faith. Now it's our duty to bring them back into the Roman Catholic fold."
For the duration of the war, "in accordance with Vatican's long-term diplomatic practice of not recognizing new states in wartime before they were legitimazed by peace treaties, the pope did not send a nuncio or diplomat to Croatia as requested, but an apostolic visitor, the abbot Giuseppe Marcone, who was to represent the Vatican to Croatian Catholic Church, not to the government. The government ignored this nuance, bestowing a prominent place for Marcone at all official functions". After World War II ended, the Usta?e who had managed to escape from Yugoslav territory (including Paveli?) were smuggled to South America. This was largely done through ratlines operated by Catholic priests who had previously secured positions at the Vatican. Some of the more infamous members of the Illyrian College of San Girolamo in Rome involved in this were Franciscan friars Krunoslav Draganovi? and Dominik Mandi?, and a third friar surnamed Petranovi? (first name unknown).
The Usta?e regime had deposited large amounts of gold--including the gold plundered from Serbs and Jews during World War II into--Swiss bank accounts. It seems a substantial quantity of gold was additionally transported by Usta?e to Austria at the end of the WWII. Out of a total, by some estimates, of 350 million Swiss francs, an intelligence report estimated 200 million (ca. $47 million) reached the Vatican. The question remains unclarified.
Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac, Archbishop of Zagreb was accused after the end of World War II by Yugoslav communist authorities of supporting the Usta?e and of exonerating those in the clergy who collaborated with them and were hence complicit in forced conversions. Stepinac stated on 28 March 1941, noting early attempts to unite Croatians and Serbs:
"All in all, Croats and Serbs are of two worlds, northpole and southpole, never will they be able to get together unless by a miracle of God. The schism (between the Catholic Church and Eastern Orthodoxy) is the greatest curse in Europe, almost greater than Protestantism. There is no moral, no principles, no truth, no justice, no honesty."
On 22 July 2016, the Zagreb County Court annulled his post-war conviction due to "gross violations of current and former fundamental principles of substantive and procedural criminal law".
In 1998 Stepinac was beatified by Pope John Paul II. On 22 June 2003 John Paul II visited Banja Luka. During the visit he held a Mass at the aforementioned Petri?evac monastery. This caused public uproar due to the connection of the monastery with Filipovi?. At the same location the Pope proclaimed the beatification of a Roman Catholic layman Ivan Merz (1896-1928), who was the founder of the "Association of Croatian Eagles" in 1923, which some view as a precursor to the Usta?e. Roman Catholic apologists defend the Pope's actions by stating the convent at Petri?evac was one of the places that went up in flames, causing the death of 80-year-old Friar Alojzije Atlija. Further, it was claimed by the apologists that the war had produced "a total exodus of the Catholic population from this region"; that the few who remained were "predominantly elderly"; and that the church in Bosnia then allegedly risked "total extinction" due to the war.
Despite representing opposing, extreme nationalisms, when confronted with the growing strength of their common enemy (i.e. the partisans), Usta?e and Chetniks throughout the Independent State of Croatia signed collaboration agreements in the spring of 1942, which for the most part held until the very end of the war. The introduction to these agreements stated:
As long as there is a danger of armed partisan gangs, Chetnik formations will voluntarily cooperate with the Croatian armed forces in fighting and destroying the partisans and will be under the command of the Croatian armed forces in these operations.
Beyond that, the agreements specified that the NDH military will supply Chetniks with arms and ammunition, Chetniks wounded in anti-partisan operations will be treated at NDH military hospitals, and widows and orphans of killed Chetnik soldiers, will receive state financial aid equal to aid received by widows and orphans of NDH soldiers. The NDH authorities arranged for Serbs in Usta?e concentration camps to be released, but only on the special recommendation of Chetnik commanders (thus, not partisans and their sympathizers). On 30 June 1942, the Chief Headquarters of the Poglavnik (i.e. Ante Paveli?), sent a statement, signed by Marshall Slavko Kvaternik, to other NDH ministries, summarizing these agreements with NDH Chetniks.
The Usta?e signed collaboration agreements with key NDH Chetnik commanders, in the following order:
On 26 May 1942, the Usta?e minister, Mladen Lorkovi?, wrote in a communique to local NDH authorities, that pursuant to these agreements "Home Guard Headquarters agrees with your proposal to grant one million kuna aid to the leaders of the Greek-Eastern community [i.e. Serb Orthodox], Mom?ilo Djuji?, Mane Rokvi?, [Branko] Bogunovi?, Paja Popovi? and Paja Om?ikus, 200 Yugoslav guns and 10 machine guns". Usta?e and Chetniks simultaneously participated, alongside German and Italian forces, in major battles against the Partisans in the NDH: the Kozara Offensive, Case White, Operation Rösselsprung, the Battle for Knin (1944), etc.
In 1945, the Chetnik commander, Mom?ilo Djuji? and his troops, with Usta?e leader Ante Paveli?'s permission, escaped across the NDH to the West. In April 1945, by his own admission, Ante Paveli? received "two generals from the headquarters Dra?a Mihailovi? and reached an agreement with them on a joint fight against Tito's communists", while in the first days of May, Chetnik units passed through Usta?e-held Zagreb, on their way to Bleiburg, after which Chetniks and members of the Usta?e army, were killed by the Partisans in various sites, including Tezno near Maribor.
At the top of the command was the Poglavnik (meaning "head") Ante Paveli?. Paveli? was appointed the office as Head of State of Croatia after Adolf Hitler had accepted Benito Mussolini's proposal of Paveli?, on 10 April 1941. The Croatian Home Guard was the armed forces of Croatia, it subsequently merged into the Croatian Armed Forces.
The flag of the Independent State of Croatia was a red-white-blue horizontal tricolor with the shield of the Coat of Arms or Croatia in the middle and the U in the upper left. Its currency was the NDH kuna.
The Usta?e greeting was "Za dom - spremni!":
This was used instead of the Nazi greeting Heil Hitler by the Usta?e. Today it is nominally associated with Usta?e sympathisers by Serbs or non-Usta?e conservatives associated with the Croatian Party of Rights. However, some Croats see it as a patriotic salute, emphasising defending one's home and country. On the internet, it is sometimes abbreviated as ZDS.
This section should include a summary of Far-right politics in Croatia. (April 2018)
The Usta?e plays an important role in Harry Turtledove's short alternate history story, Ready for the Fatherland. It plays a brief background role in In the Presence of Mine Enemies, an unrelated work by the same author. In both these works, the regime founded by Paveli? lasted several decades beyond the 1940s.
The popular Croatian singer, Thompson, regularly starts his concerts with the Usta?e salute. The Wiesenthal Center has protested this, along with other attempts at revisionism and Holocaust-denial in Croatia.
Seeking to unify support for Croatia's independence, Franjo Tu?man, Croatia's first president, in the late 1980s advocated "pomirba", i.e. national reconciliation between Usta?e and Partisans. This led to a revival of pro-Usta?e views, symbols and salutes among the Croatian political right. Following Croatia's Independence in the 1990s, streets were renamed to carry the name of Usta?e leaders, such as Mile Budak and Jure Franceti?. Although some of these were later removed, Radio Free Europe noted that of some 20 streets dedicated to Mile Budak in the '90s, half of these still remained in Croatia in 2019.
Jewish and Serb organizations, Croat historians and antifascists, as well as international observers, have repeatedly warned of revisionism in Croatia, which seeks to minimize Usta?e crimes, even celebrates the Usta?e regime. Recent examples include the publication of a book celebrating "the Croatian knight", Maks Luburic, who as head of Usta?e concentration camps was responsible for over 100,000 deaths, during Usta?e genocides against Jews, Serbs and Roma, and a documentary minimizing children's deaths in Usta?e concentration camps. The Luburic book was promoted with the assistance of the Croatian Catholic Church, and Church sources minimized children's deaths in concentration camps. Croat historians have noted that the Church has been a leader in promoting revisionism and minimizing Usta?e crimes. In 2013, the newspaper of Croatian Catholic archdioceses, Glas Koncila, published a series on Jasenovac, by the Jasenovac-denier Igor Vukic, who claims Jasenovac was a "mere work-camp", where no mass executions took place. In 2015, the head of the Croatian Bishops' Conference asked that the Usta?e "Za dom spremni" salute be adopted by the Croatian army.
Croatian soccer fans have repeatedly chanted the Usta?e, "Za dom spremni" salute, for which FIFA and UEFA have repeatedly leveled penalties against the Croatian soccer federation, for "fascists outburst". In 2014, the Croatian soccer player Josip ?imuni? was banned from the FIFA World Cup for leading a stadium full of fans in the Usta?e salute.
In 2014 the then-mayor of Split, Croatia unveiled a monument dedicated to the 1990s HOS brigade named "The Knight Rafael Boban", after the Usta?e commander, which includes the HOS emblem with the Usta?e "Za dom spremni" salute. Since then the HOS organization has organized annual commemorations at the memorial on 10 April (the anniversary of the founding of the Usta?e Independent State of Croatia), during which the black-uniformed participants shout the Usta?e "Za dom spremni" salute.
In 2016 the Croatian HOS war veterans' organization, posted a plaque at Jasenovac concentration camp with the Usta?e "Za dom spremni" salute. Despite protests by Jewish and other organizations, this was allowed to remain until criticism by the US State Department special envoy on Holocaust issues, forced the government to move it to a nearby town. As a result of this, and allegations of the government's tolerance for the minimization of Usta?e crimes, Jewish, Serb and Croat WWII resistance groups refused to appear with government representatives at the annual Jasenovac commemoration.
In 2019 the Austrian government passed a law forbidding the display of Usta?e symbols, along with previously banned Nazi symbols, largely as a result of the display of same by Croatian nationalists at the annual, Croatian government-sponsored Bleiburg commemorations, where Austrian police have repeatedly arrested Croat nationalists for Nazi and fascist salutes. Three Austrian EU parliamentarians declared the Bleiburg ceremony, which tens-of-thousands of Croat nationalist attend, "the largest fascist gathering in Europe" The Austrian Catholic Church banned a Mass by the Croatian Catholic Church at Bleiburg because, as they stated, "the Mass at Bleiburg has become part of a manifestation that is politically instrumentalised and is part of a political-national ritual that serves to selectively experience and interpret history", adding that it misuses "a religious service for political purposes while not distancing itself from the Fascist worldview."
After World War II, the Usta?e movement was split into several organizations and there is presently no political or paramilitary movement that claims its legacy as their "successor". The term "usta?e" is today used as a derogatory term for Croatian ultranationalism. The term "Usta?e" is sometimes used among Serbs to describe Serbophobia or more generally to defame political opponents.
Since the end of World War II, Serbian historians have used the Usta?e to promote that Serbs resisted the Axis, while Croats and Bosniaks widely supported them. However, the Usta?e lacked support among ordinary Croats and never accrued any significant support among the populace. The Usta?e regime was backed by parts of the Croatian population that during the interwar period had felt oppressed in the Serbian-led Yugoslavia. Most of the support it had initially gained by creating a Croat national state was lost because of the brutal practices it used. In the 1980s, Serbian historians produced many works about the forced conversion during World War II of Serbs to Catholicism in Usta?e Croatia. These debates between historians openly became nationalistic and also entered the wider media. Historians in Belgrade during the 1980s who had close government connections often went on television during the evenings to discuss invented or real details about the Usta?e genocide against Serbs during World War II. Serb clergy and nationalists blamed all Croats for crimes committed by the Usta?e, and for planning a genocide against Serb people. These propagandistic activities were aimed at justifying planned crimes and ethno-demographic engineering in Croatia.
No one really knows how many died here. Serbs talk of 700,000. Most estimates put the figure nearer 100,000.